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A STUDY OF THE STATUTES WHICH CONTAIN
THE TERM "SUBJECT OF THE ACTION"
AND WHICH RELATE TO JOINDER
OF ACTIONS AND PLAINTIFFS
AND TO COUNTERCLAIMS
CARL C. WHEATON*
PART IIt
We turn, temporarily, from definitions to problems of another
type which are raised by the statutes under investigation.
In order that we may have vividly before us the portions of the
statutes presently to be investigated, I shall, at the expense of repe-
tition, state them. "The plaintiff may unite several causes of action
* * * * * * where they all arise out of the same transaction or transac-
tions connected with the same subject of the action." Some acts
have a comma after transaction. "The counter-claim must be a
cause of action arising out of the * * * * * * transaction pleaded
in the complaint, or connected with the subject of the action."
There has been considerable discussion as to whether or not causes
of action may be joined or counterclaimed if they either arise out of
the same transaction or are connected with the subject of the action.
The majority of courts answer this question in the affirmative,
with little or no reasoning, both as to the joinder of causes of action 50
and counterclaims. 1 ' This, however, is not the unanimous result.
There are those who state that the causes to be joined (or, probably,
counterclaimed) must be connected with the subject of the action,
even though they arise out of the same transaction,5 2 and there
*Professor of Law, St. Louis University School of Law.
tPart I of this article appeared in the December 1932 issue of THE CORNELL
LAw QUARTERLY at page 20.
'"Craft Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. Quinnipiac Brewing Co., 63 Conn. 551,
29 Atl. 76, 25 L. R. A. 856 (1893); Robinson v. Flint, i6 How. Pr. 240 (N. Y.
1858); Bruce v. Kelly, 5 Hun 229 (N. Y. 1875); Smith v. Newberry, i4o N. C.
385, 53 S. E. 234 (19o6); McCullen v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 146 N. C. 568,
6o S. E. 5o6 (19o8); Sharum v. Sharum, ioi Okla. 273, 225 Pac. 682 (1924);
Panther v. McKnight, 26 Okla. 134, 256 Pac. 916 (1926); Stone v. Case, 34
Okla. 5, 124 Pac. 960, 43 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1168 (1912); POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES
(5th ed. 1929) § 361.
'Tinsley v. Tinsley, 54 Ky. 454 (15 Mon. B. 1854); Northwestern Port Huron
Co. v. Iverson, 22 S. D. 314, 117 N. W. 372, 133 Am. St. Rep. 920 (19o8); BOONE,
CODE PLEADING (1885) § 87.
162Sherwood v. Holbrook, 98 Misc. 668, 163 N. Y. Supp. 326 (Supreme Court
1917); Cline v. Southern Ry. Co., 96 S. E. 532 (S. C. 1918); VAN SANTWOOD,
EQUITY PRACTIcE (1874) vol. 1, pp. 99-10.
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are those believing that, though the causes of actions are connected
with the same subject of the action, they cannot be joined' 53 or
counterclaimedM unless they arise out of the same transaction.
It should be carefully noticed that the propounders of the law, in
deciding this matter, seem to pay no attention to the punctuation
of the statutes. An excellent example of this is found in the cases
of Koepke v. Winterfield and Alliance Elevator Co. v. Wells."6
The identical statute under inquiry was Section 2647 of Sanborn and
Berryman Ann. St. (Rev. St. r898). This act in fact read, "the
same transaction or transactions connected with the subject of
action." In the first case the court wrote it as reading with a comma
after transactions, and quoted the second case, which it cited as
copying the statute the same way. The fact is the judge in the
Alliance Elevator Co. decision reproduced the section there in ques-
tion correctly without any comma, but in the headnote to the case
in the Northwestern Reporter a comma is shown after transaction.
The importance of punctuation will be mentioned later.
We have seen that the majority of writers interpret the statutes
under inquiry as allowing joinder of actions and counterclaims which
do not arise out of the same transaction if they are connected with
the subject of the action.5 7 This leads us, necessarily, to the mean-
ing of connected with as those words appear in the enactments here
involved. There are few definite statements defining this term.
The language closest to a definition is that connected with must be
considered as something different from arising out of; in other words,
the defendant's cause of action (in case of a- counterclaim) may
be sufficiently connected with the subject of the action although
it does not arise out of the transaction.5 8
Though statements tagged as definitions are rare, there is a variety
of declarations which tell us what type of connection is necessary,
and these, in turn, suggest the ordinary meaning of connected with,
that is, linked together or associated with. Some of these sugges-
tions are that the connection- with the subject of the action must be
153Fish v. Chase, II4 Minn. 46o, 3i N. W. 63i (19ri); Adams v. Bissell &
Noble, 28 Barb. 382 (N. Y. I858) which goes so far as to say that the phrase "or
transactions connected with the subject of the action" is useless and unmeaning
surplus, for subject of action must not refer to the different counts, but to the
action as a writ.
15'Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Pierce, 95 Ind. 496 (1884) which would allow a
counterclaim in tort only when the tort to be counterclaimed arose out of a
contract transaction in relation to which the plaintiff sued.
n5I16 Wis. 44, 92 N. W. 437 (1902). 1593 Wis. 5, 66 N. W. 796 (1896).
157Supra note 15o. '5 POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) § 670.
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legal, immediate, and direct;159 immediate and direct, and in contract
cases, something that the parties can be assumed to have contem-
plated in their dealings with each other.1 0
Other criteria used are that "transactions connected with the same
subject of action were for all practical purposes limited to causes
of action which were mutually related in process of causation and
to general equitable relief";161 that a counterclaim must be so con-
nected with the subject of plaintiff's action that it will be just and
equitable that the controversy between the parties should be settled
in one action and by one litigation. 1 2
A very important question is as to whether or not the connection
between transactions and the subject of the action, when one wishes
to join causes, and between the counterclaim and the subject of
the action, in cases of counterclaims, has to be complete. That
is, must each transaction out of which causes of action to be joined
arise deal with every element of the subject of the action; must
each component part of the subject of the action be present as an
ingredient of every counterclaim to the plaintiff's cause of action
which contains the subject of the action? There is very little author-
ity dealing directly with this question. That existing does the
expected thing. It conflicts.1 3 Actually, the courts giving a narrow
159SuTHERLAND, CODE PLEADING (1910-1917) § 633.
16OHaberle-Crystal Spring Brewing Co. v. Handrahan, IOO Misc. 163, 165
N, Y. Supp. 251 (Supreme Court 1917); LcClare v. Thibault, 41 Ore. 6o,, 69
Pac. 552 (1902); POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) § 670. Professor
Gavit, in The Code Cause of Action (193o) 3o COL. L. REV. 802, having defined
subject of the action as "the factual situation", says actions joined or counter-
claimed must have come into being out of factual situations connected with the
factual situation that is the subject of the action. There is the necessary con-
nection if "but for some fact in the subject of the action there would not have
existed the factual situations in the other causes of action to be joined, or in the
counterclaims." In this same article he defines "arising out of" as "coming into
being out of". .6(1925) 3 N. Y. L. REV. 429.
16Boothe v. Armstrong, 8o Conn. 218, 67 Atl. 484 (1907); Shaeffef v. 0. K.
Tool Co., io Conn. 528, 148 Atl. 330 (1929); Grange v. Gilbert, io Civ. Pro.
R. 8 (N. Y. 1885); Carpenter v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 93 N. Y. 552 (1883);
Moses v. Moses, 17o App. Div. 211, 155 N. Y. Supp. IO66(Ist Dept. 1915); Union
Ferry Co. of N. Y. and Brooklyn v. Fairchild, IO6 Misc. 324, 176 N. Y. Supp.
251 (Supreme Court 1919) reversed in 191 App. Div. 639, 182 N. Y. Supp. 125
(Ist Dept. 1920) on another ground; J. M. & L. A. Osborn Co. v. Kennedy, rI3
Misc. 615, 185 N. Y. Supp. 75 (Supreme Court 1920); POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES
(5th ed. 1929) § 652.
' l6sTelulah Paper Co. v. Patten Paper Co., 132 Wis. 425, 112 N. W. 522 (1907)
gives a negative answer, whereas NASH, PLEADING AND PRACTICE UNDER THE
CiviL CODE (2nd ed. 1874) P. 37, states that the general result should be in the
affirmative.
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interpretation to the phrase the subject of the action probably reach
an affirmative result in the majority of instances, but those attaching
to it a broad meaning most often come to the opposite conclusion.
A final, and important, proposition in relation to the meaning of
connected with is that the mere fact that the defendant sets up acts
on the part of the plaintiff which are prejudicial to the defendant,
and alleges them as the reason the defendant did the acts complained
of by the plaintiff does not constitute a connection between the
subject of the plaintiff's cause of action and the defendant's cause
of action. It merely shows a motive.IM
Our next inquiry deals with the types of cases which may be joined
because they arise out of transactions connected with the subject
of the action. One problem is as to whether or not causes may be
joined whether or not they are of a kind already mentioned in
prior subdivisions of the act, one subdivision of which includes the
phrase now under discussion. In fact, though the matter is not
actually mentioned, the great majority of cases decide that actions
may be joined whether or not they are spoken of in the other sub-
divisions. There is some authority that way which expressly con-
siders the point.'65 In fact, this idea is so strong that the ninth sub-
division of a statute, which read to the effect that causes might be
joined where they were brought to recover" (9) upon claims * * * * * *
not included within one of the foregoing subdivisions of this section"
was interpreted to mean that there might be a joinder of causes
"not included within one only of the foregoing subdivisions of this
section."' 66
Another question that arises is: do all actions to be joined under
the statute now under inspection have to belong to only one of the
subdivisions mentioned therein? The answer necessitates dealing
with a part of the statute not yet discussed, which reads to the effect
that "all causes of action so united must all belong to one of these
classes." Again we have a situation where there is little authority
that definitely grapples with the proper answer, but the practical
result is that all causes to be joinable must belong to one of the classes
mentioned. That includes the idea, however, that actions covered
by the transaction subdivision, which allows the joinder of actions
arising out of the same transaction, or transactions connected with
'"Mulberger v. Koenig, 2 Wis. 558, 22 N. W. 745 (1885). Much the same
point has arisen in relation to the necessary connection between facts to make
them all parts of a single transaction. See supra notes 77 and 78.
165Zimmerman v. Kunkel, 43 Hun 638, 6 N. Y. St. Rep. 768 (1887).
'"People v. Wells, 52 App. Div. 583, 65 N. Y. Supp. 319 (4th Dept. i9oo).
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the same subject of the action, may be joined though they are kinds
of actions mentioned in several of the other subdivisions, because
they all belong to one class of cases mentioned in the statute, that
is, they all pertain to the transaction subdivision. This result finds
definite support,6 7 but the opposite conclusion has also been distinctly
reached.""
This completes the authorities dealing with specific portions of the
statute relating to the subject of the action. It remains to consider
two suggestions having to do with it as a whole. They relate, first,
to what is called the reciprocal test. This is that one may counter-
claim if the plaintiff could counter-claim, presuming that the defen-
dant had sued as plaintiff, but, if the plaintiff could not, under such
circumstances, have counter-claimed, the defendant may not do it.
This appears to be a New York doctrine. The courts specifically
referring to the matter are in discord."9
The second proposition is that merely stating that causes arise
out of the same transaction or transactions connected with the same
subject of the action is an insufficient allegation. The facts in the
pleading must show that such is the truth.7 0
Though, in discussing the meaning of the subject of the action, and,
incidentally thereto, that of object of the action, or relief demanded,
we have considered the permissive joinder of parties statute, as
far as subject of the action is concerned, the balance of that act has
been left untouched, and must, therefore, be scrutinized, at this time.
The usual wording of the law is that "all parties having an interest
in the subject of the action, and in obtaining the relief demanded,
may be joined as plaintiffs, * * *** *." One can readily see from
the terms of this enactment that the following questions are left
for discussion. What is meant by an interest in? Must that interest
be in both the subject of the action and in the relief requested? What
type of interest is essential? Must the interest of each plaintiff be
in all of the subject of the action and relief demanded? Must all
persons who may join have an identical interest?
'"Polley v. Wilkisson, 5 Civ. Pro. R. 135 (N. Y. 1884).
16 Hunter v. Powell, 15 How. Pr. 221 (N. Y. 1857); Teall v. The City of Syra-
cuse, 31 Hun 332 (N. Y. 1884); Raynor v. Brennan, 4o Hun 6o (N. Y. i886);
MCGARY, TREATISE ON PLEADING (1875) § 27 (perhaps); NASH, PLEADING AND
PRACTICE UNDER THE CIVIL CODE (2nd ed. 1874) pp. 35-38.
1 9Adams v. Schwartz, 137 App. Div. 230, 122 N. Y. Supp. 41 (ist Dept. i9IO);
Stevenson v. Devins, 158 App. Div. 616, 143 N. Y. Supp. 916 (1st Dept. 1913);
Seidman v. McCahill, 182 N. Y. Supp. 8oo (Supreme Court 192o) approve this
test. J. M. and L. A. Osborn Co. v. Kennedy, 113 Misc. 615, 185 N. Y. Supp. 75
(Supreme Court 192o) believes it is of little value.
"
0
°Flynn v. Bailey, 50 Barb. 73 (N. Y. 1867).
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Taking up these questions in order, let us look to the dictionaries
for the meaning of interest. We find that it is a right, title, share, or
participation in a thing;'7' the fact or relation of being concerned
in or connected with a thing through having a right or title to it,
a share in it, or some claim upon it, a right to a share in something. 72
One dictionary states that in law it means, in the most general
sense, the legal concern of a person in a thing or in the conduct of
another person, whether it consists in a right of enjoyment in or
benefit from property, or a right of advantage, or a subjection to
liability in the event of conduct. 73 Cases are lacking in which un-
adulterated definitions of this term are to be found.
The second query seems to be answered almost unanimously to
the effect that a joinder is allowed under the act now being discussed
only if the plaintiffs have the essential interest in both the subject
of the action and in the relief requested, though the answer seems
so obvious that the point is scarcely ever specifically dealt with.
But even here there is a dissenting note. 74
Before we proceed to consider the answers to the remaining ques-
tions stated above, we should notice three problems, the discussion
of which is so intertwined in judicial decisions that a person is not
always certain whether or not the court had only one of them in
mind. I refer to questions dealing with the kind of interest which
is essential, that is, common, joint, and the like; with the amount
of interest requisite, that is, in all, or less than all, of the subject
of the action and relief requested; and with the necessity of equality
of interest among the various plaintiffs. For instance, if the court
says that the interest of the plaintiffs must, or need not, be common,
it may not be clear whether the intention is to refer merely to the
necessary type of interest. It may be touching upon the matters of
amount, or of equality of interest, or with all three things.
With this interpolated warning, let us continue our search and
turn our attention next to the type of interest that must exist in
the subject of the action and in the relief requested. There are
several authorities holding that the interest need not be joint in either
the subject of the action, or in the relief requested,75 while others
deal similarly with only the subject of the action, saying nothing
'nWEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY.
"172THE NEW CENTURY DICTIONARY; MURRAY'S NEW OxFoRD DICTIONARY.
173THE CENTURY DICTIONARY AND ENCYCLOPEDIA.
174VAN SANTWOOD, EQUITY PRACTICE (1874) vol. 1, pp. 74-76.
276Loomis v. Brown, 16 Barb. 325 (N. Y. 1853); Schiffer v. City of Eau Claire,
51 Wis. 385, 8 N. W. 253 (188I); VAN SANqTWOOD, EQUITY PRACTICE (1874)
vol. 1, pp. 99--IOI.
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about the relief requested.7 1 What is meant by this is not explained,
but the ordinary meaning of the term joint can be presumed. Another
negative expression which is used in designating the requisite type
of interest is that it need not be common in either the subject of
the action or in the relief requested.'" Van Santwood's Equity
Practice7 8 expresses the opposite conclusion, and McIntosh v. Zar-
ing 9 may also do this, but the court merely says there may be a
joinder of plaintiffs, for they had a common interest in the relief
requested, and, presumably, in the subject of the action. The
significance of common is so indefinite that I should not attempt
to interpret the courts' meaning of that word with any certainty of
being correct. It may refer to a joint interest, or an interest in
common. It is quite probalile that it does not denote the idea of
separateness. And a further declaration is that persons may not
join as plaintiffs when the only community of interest is in the
question of law or fact.18
But, presuming that several persons have the proper type of
interest in the subject of the action and in the relief demanded,
must the interests of each one be in all of the subject of the action
and in all of the relief demanded, or in the whole of either one of
them? As far as this question refers to the subject of the action,
the answer might depend on what the subject of the action was.
If it was said to be the right of one of the plaintiffs, necessarily that
one, at least, would have to have an interest in all of the subject
of the action, but, if the subject of the action was tangible realty,
the result might be different. I have, however, found no case which
has presented this distinction. In dealing with this problem we must
also observe that, from a practical viewpoint, its answer may be
closely connected with the further question as to whether or not
the interests of the joining plaintiffs in the subject of the action
must be equal.
It will be valuable, therefore, to determine what inferences should
be drawn from decisions which consider the problem dealing with the
portion of the subject of the action in which joining plaintiffs must
17 Shelton v. Harrison, 182 Mo. App. 404, 167 S. W. 634 (1914), which was an
equity case; KEIGwiN, CASES IN CODE PLEADING (1926) p. 321.177Loomis v. Brown, 16 Barb. 325 (N. Y. 1853); Metropolitan Trust Co. of
the City of New York v. Stao, 166 App. Div. 649, 152 N. Y. Supp. 173 (Ist
Dept. 1915), probably, but may refer only to the subject of the action, for it says
the interest need not be common in the cause of action.
17Vol. I, pp. 99-1O. 179150 Ind. 3o, 49 N. E. 164 (1898):
'
8OBallew Lumber and Hardware Co. v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 288 Mo. 473,
232 S. W. 1015 (1921).
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be interested, and that having to do with the necessity of the similar-
ity of those interests. If it is declared that each plaintiff need have
an interest in only part of the subject of the action, nothing is
determined concerning the necessity of the equality of the partial
interests therein, for the various plaintiffs could have such interests
which would be unequal. Yet, if the conclusion is that each plaintiff
must be interested in all of the subject of the action, then, by in-
ference, each plaintiff must have a similarity of interest in it, because
the entire interest essential to all must always be the same.
If the holding is that the interests of the plaintiff need not be
identical, then logic forces us to say that each plaintiff need not
have an interest in all of the subject of the action, for, even though
one of the plaintiffs had to have an interest in the entire subject
of the action, if the interests of the others therein could differ from
that of this supposed plaintiff, necessarily these others could each
have an interest in less than the whole of the subject of the action.
But, if the decision is that the interests of the plaintiffs in the subject
of the action must be identical, we get no definite information as
to whether or not the plaintiffs' interests must be in all of the subject
of the action, for identical interest might be partial. Again, the legal
writers have not specifically called attention to these truths. What
they have done is merely to state, on the one hand, that it is sufficient
if the plaintiffs each have an interest in part of the subject of the
action,"" or to declare that their interests therein may differ,8 2 and,
on the other hand, to decide that the interests must be the same.",
It is next in order to determine whether or not each plaintiff must
be interested in all of the relief demanded. This problem has caused
more difficulty than the same one having to do with the subject of
the action. This may be because of the wording of the statute. It
will be recalled that it provides for the joinder of plaintiffs having
"an interest in the subject of the action, and in obtaining the relief
"'Grover v. Maratt, 192 Ind. 552, 136 N. E. 81 (1922); American Plate Glass
Co. v. Nicoson, 34 Ind. App. 643, 73 N. E. 625 (1905); Shelton v. Harrison,
182 Mo. App. 404 (1914); Wilson v. Hampton, 2 Posey. Cas. 426 (Tex. 1882).
1"Grover v. Maratt, 192 Ind. 522, 136 N. E. 81 (1922);. Earle v. Burch, 21
Neb. 702, 33 N. W. 254 (1887); Loomis v. Brown, 16 Barb. 325 (N. Y. 1853);
Metropolitan Trust Co. of the City of New York v. Stallo, 166 App. Div. 649,
152 N. Y. Supp. 173 (Ist Dept. 1915); School-Districts v. Edwards, 46 Wis. I5O,
49 N. W. 96 (1879); Schiffer v. City of Eau Claire, 51 Wis. 385, 8 N. W. 253
(1881); KEIGWlN, CASES IN CODE PLEADING (1926) p. 321; KINNE, PLEADING
AND PRACTICE (1888) § 54; POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) § 115;
SUTHERLAND, CODE PLEADING (1910-1917) § 17.
'3WHITTAKER, NEW YORK PRAcTIcE (1852) p. 58.
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demanded". It will be seen that the words an interest are not inserted
before "in obtaining the relief demanded". This omission may
have led some courts to decide that an interest did not refer to "the
relief demanded," and, therefore, to conclude that each plaintiff
must be interested in all of the recovery. The holdings do not,
however, directly say this.
In continuing the discussion of the authorities on this subject,
we must, as we did when considering the necessary interest which
plaintiffs must have in subject of the action, call attention to the
close connection between the questions dealing with the portion of
the relief demanded in which the plaintiffs must have an interest,
and that having to do with the necessity of identity of their interests
therein, for the writers almost always give their decisions in terms
of similarity of interest and say nothing specifically as to the answer
to the other question, or vice versa. In doing this, have they by
inference given their reply to both inquiries? The same answers to
this question are reached as was the case when we discussed the
identical problems in relation to the subject of the action. The
reader is, therefore, referred to that discussion.18
As might well be expected, those who have turned their attention
to the answering of the question now under discussion have reached
different conclusions. Some decide that a partial interest in the
relief requested is sufficient,'5 even when a portion,' or all,'8 7 of
the recovery will be in the form of a money judgment. Others have
reached the opposite result.' Then there have been those who have
treated the matter from the viewpoint of the equality of interest
in the relief demanded. Of these, one school of thought has deter-
mined that identity of such interest is unnecessary, 89 though only a
money judgment is demanded. 9 This result has ordinarily not
been reasoned out, but some authorities have put it on the ground
184See pages 47-5 o.
1OKEIGWIN, CASES IN CODE PLEADING (1926) p. 321.
1
xAmerican Plate Glass Co. v. Nicoson, 34 Ind. App. 643, 73 N. E. 625 (I9O5).187Mclntosh v. Zaring, i5o Ind. 3oi, 49 N. E. 164 (1898); Trompen v. Yates,
66 Neb. 525, 92 N. W. 647 (1902); Lyon v. Bertram, 6i U. S. (20 How.) r49
(1857); Schiffer, Adm'r. v. The City of Eau Claire, 51 Wis. 385, 8 N. W. 253
(1881).
18 Hellams v. Switzer, 24 S. C. 39 (1885), apparently. The cases holding this
way do not often deal with the matter definitely.
'"Grover v. Maratt, 192 Ind. 552, 136 N. E. 81 (1922); Loomis v. Brown,
16 Barb. 325 (N. Y. 1853); KINNE, PLEADING AND PRACTICE (1888) § 54; SUTHER-
LAND, CODE PLEADING (1910-1917) § 17.
19 School-Districts v. Edwards, 46 Wis. 15o, 49 N. W. 968 (1879); Schiffer v.
City of Eau Claire, 51 Wis. 385, 8 N. W. 253 (i881).
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that the statute is broad enough to allow such a holding."' It has,
on the other hand, been decided that there must be an equality of
interests in the recovery. 19 2
This completes the story of the authorities. It is now in order
to proceed to a personal interpretation of the statutes. For the
last time, let us set forth the usual statutes in order that they may
be clear in our minds.
"The plaintiff may unite in the same petition several causes
of action, whether they be such as have been heretofore denomi-
nated legal or equitable or both, where they all arise out of:
First, the same transaction or transactions connected with the
same subject of action; Second, etc.
But the causes of action so united must all belong to one of
these classes, * * * * * *"
"The counterclaim must be an existing one in favor of a
defendant and against a plaintiff between whom a several judg-
ment might be had in the action and must be: A cause of action
arising out of the contract or transaction pleaded in the com-
plaint, or connected with the subject of the action; * * * * * * *.
"All persons having an interest in the subject of the action,
and in obtaining the relief demanded, may be joined as plain-tiffs, * * * * * * *."
These usual statutes should be treated as permissive, for the word
may, not must, appears in them. That is as far as most legislatures
seem prepared to go. Where must is found, the statutes should be
treated as being mandatory.
They should be interpreted in the light of equitable principles
which are applicable thereto, because their original framers had
those doctrines in mind, and because the very statutes point the same
way. They either state specifically that they apply to both legal and
equitable cases or they make no distinction between them. That
means that they deal with law and equity cases, and that they should
be broadly interpreted in order to avoid a multiplicity of actions.
This breadth is further suggested by the fact that these enactments
are remedial.
The terms therein should be defined, for they were placed there
for a purpose and were intended to have meanings which, I believe,
were very definite in the minds of those originally drafting the laws,
though, perhaps, in later days legislatures have sometimes, with
little thought, played that childhood game of follow the leader.
121POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) § 115 is an example of this.
292VAN SAxTwooD, EQUITY PRACTICE (1874) vol. I, pp. 74-76; WHITTAKER,
NEW YORK PRACTICE (1852) p. 58.
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But even though that is true, their leaders' ideas should be applied
to the acts.
Transaction has no technical meaning. It was a word in common
use before its connection with these statutes or their progenitor, the
equity practice. It means the same thing in the joinder of actions
and counterclaim statutes because these laws have the same general
purpose of avoiding many actions, and because they were generally
enacted at the same time, and, very often, as part of a unified series
bf remedial laws. This word is not synonymous with cause of action,
contract, or subject of the action, for those terms are also found in the
acts in which transaction appears. Moreover, if one should replace
transaction with cause of action or subject of the action the statutes
would not be sensible. Transaction refers to any occurrence between
two or more persons which may become the foundation of an action.
That must be the ordinary meaning of the term when one puts it
in the legal settings with which we are dealing. Therefore, it is
broad enough to include situations resulting in legal, equitable,
contract, and tort actions. Its scope should encompass any group of
circumstances which are connected, that is, which have a bearing
one upon another. It should cover acts which occur because some-
thing else has occurred. Thus, if A slanders B, and, because of
this, B slanders A, these facts should be treated as comprising a
single transaction. The fact that acts occur at approximately the
same time does not necessarily result in one transaction, but that is,
properly, the ordinary outcome, for in such a situation the acts
usually do have a bearing one upon the other. Thus, if A assaults
and batters B because B stole A's horse, and, at the same, or approxi-
mately the same time, calls B a thief, and has him arrested for the
alleged theft, there is but a single transaction involved. Everyone
of those acts had a direct connection with the theft. They all dealt
with it. Yet, if A assaulted and battered B because the latter would
not pay a note then due from B to A, and at the same meeting,
had B arrested for an alleged theft of a horse, two transactions
would have occurred, for the note and theft had nothing in common.
The statement that, in contract cases, facts, to be a part of a transac-
tion, must have been within the contemplation of the parties will
be correct only if it means to give as broad an interpretation to
transaction as has already been suggested. It must also be remem-
bered that it is the actuality, not the parties' pleadings, which deter-
mine the limits of a transaction. A counterclaim, for instance,
must, under our system if the plaintiff is a good pleader, show
further facts than those which should be stated by the plaintiff, for
he should not set forth a case against himself.
SUBJECT OF ACTION
The definition of subject of the action seems to have been the most
difficult problem connected with the interpretation of these statutes.
As was the case with transaction, the term must mean the same thing
in all of these statutes, and for th same reasons. They were enacted
to avoid a multplicity of actions, and were usually passed as different
sections of the same remedial statute. It has been said that, in seek-
ing the meaning of this term as it relates to the statutes now involved,
all of the other statutes of the state, the joinder or counterclaim
statutes of which are being investigated, and which contain this
phrase, should be taken into consideration. It is suggested that laws
relating to attachment of property and to the publication of service
in the county where the subject of the action exists, and in which
the subject of the action is undoubtedly a tangible thing, should be
consulted in determining the meaning of the phrase in the
section now involved. This is incorrect, for those types of laws have
an entirely different purpose than those in which we are now inter-
ested. They were not passed to avoid a multiplicity of suits, but to
allow the plaintiff to obtain a judgment in the state passing the law,
which judgment could be at least partially satisfied, and which result
could not have been obtained without the passage of the laws.
Subject of the action does not mean cause of action since both terms
are found in two of the statutes and therefore they must be intended
to have different meanings. If subject of the action is replaced by
cause of action in the counterclaim statute we find that the counter-
claim will be connected with itself. This proves that the two terms
are not identical. Therefore subject of the action is not the substantive
right of the one suing to recover, which is, in turn, based on his
primary right, the correlative duty of the person sued, and the
facts involved, including the damage done (except in cases where the
damage is prospective), for those things together make up the cause
of action. Though statutes say one should state the facts constitut-
ing his causes of action, those words should be interpreted as meaning
that he should set forth that part of his causes of action which
consists of facts, and not that the facts alone make up the causes of
action. He is excused from pleading the law involved in his causes.
Neither are subject of the action and transaction synonymous. Both
terms. are found in two of the statutes and must be intended to have
different meanings. If one replaces subject of the action with transac-
tion or vice versa there is no sense in the results. Nor do subject
of the action and object of the action mean the same thing. To begin
with, the words object and subject are different and, in all likelihood,
mean different things. Moreover, the object of the action is the
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result to be obtained, the judgment and its enforcement. This
object can only be realized after a cause of action has arisen. The
transactions, according to the counterclaim statute, are to be con-
nected, with the subject of the action. This would be impossible if
the subject of the action was the judgment and iis enforcement
(the object of the action), for the causes of action must arise out of
the transactions, and, therefore, the transactions, as far as their
connection with the causes of action involved is concerned, must
have completed their existence by the time those actions came into
existence. As a result, they could not have any connection with an
object of the action, which would come into being after they had
ceased to exist.
Further suggestions are that the subject of the action is the
primary right of the party suing, the primary duty of the person
sued, the wrongful action or inaction of the one defending, the bring-
ing of the action, the things involved, whether tangible or intangible,
the title to property, its possession, and combinations of these.
The primary right cannot be the subject of the action, for, if it were,
there could be a joinder of those actions which must arise out of
transactions connected with the subject of the action only when the
connection of the transaction was with one particular right of the
plaintiff. This wouldnotunderthe ordinary statute be an extension of
the right of joinder over the other subdivisions of the joinder statutes,
for under them one may, in general, join all the actions which he has
against the defendant which involve one particular type of right,
such as all slander actions, or actions on contract. The same type
of argument is properly used to show that the subject of the action is
not the duty of the defending person not to interfere with the rights
of the one suing, for, if duty is substituted for subject of the action
in the joinder of actions statute, the transactions must be connected
with that single type of duty. Under the other subdivisions of the
statute actions connected with that duty could be joined. Thus
actions involving a duty not to injure the plaintiff's reputation would
be slander or libel actions, or those dealing with the duty not to
break a contract would be contract actions and any number of
slander or libel actions could be joined by one party against another,
as could various contract actions. Combine these arguments and
we conclude that the subject of the action could not consist of the
right and duty mentioned.
Nor is the subject of the action the defendant's wrong. Actions to
be joined may arise out of transactions connected with the subject
of the action. If the defendant's wrong is substituted for the subject
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of the action, the statute will read that the transactions should be
connected with the defendant's wrong. The result would be that the
transactions should be connected with part of themselves, for the
defendant's wrong is one or more of the acts making up the transac-
tions with which the causes of action are connected. To hold that the
subject of the action is the defendant's wrong is to, in effect, make
transaction and subject of the action synonymous. This, as has
been previously shown,' is improper. Also, the counterclaim may
be connected with the subject of the action. If the defendant's
wrong is substituted for the subject of the action, we find that the
counterclaims may be connected with the defendant's wrong. That
is, the defendant's causes of action may be connected with his own
wrong. How can such a connection exist? Combinations of this
wrong with the primary right or duty already spoken of are not
the subject of the action, since the right or duty cannot be a part of
the subject of the action anymore than they can be the whole of it.
It has been said that the subject of the action was the right to be in-
fringed and the infringement thereof, *because without the existence
of these, there could be no subject of the action. This is not right,
for the term subject of the action does not, on its face, seem to refer
to several things. But, even if it does, the idea that a right and its
infringement must come into being before something else can exist
points to the existence of a cause of action rather than to that of a
subject of the action, for it is true that there can be no cause of action
unless there is a right and an infringement thereof by someone
having a duty not to have so acted.
The idea that the bringing of a lawsuit is the subject of the action
is likewise incorrect. The latter term connotes that it has something
to do with the existence of the' action. The subject of anything
certainly refers to that with which it deals, and an action could
not have to do with anything which did not exist until after the
cause of action arose. The suit is not brought until the cause of
action is in being, and, therefore, it could not be the subject thereof.
We shall finally consider things (in both the broad and narrow
meaning of that word) and the title to, and possession of them as pos-
sible subjects of the action. Title or possession thereof are not the
subject of the action for there are many things to which we do not
truly have title, or of which we do not have possession. Examples
of such things are the body, a reputation, the marital relationship.
Suppose we treat the title to, or possession of, tangible property
as the subject of the action, the transaction subdivision of the usual
L 193p. 56.
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joinder statute would be a repetition of its other subdivisions, for
they allow a joinder of actions dealing with the title or possession
of property. This result was clearly not intended. That leaves us
the possibility of saying that things are the subjects of actions. My
inclination is to give the term subject of the action the very broadest
meaning that logic, the statutes, and their history will allow. I
should like to say that it is everything with which one of the actions
to be joined, or the plaintiff's action, where an alleged counter-
claim is pleaded, deals. But I cannot. History and logic force me
to say that the thing involved is the subject of the action. These statutes
are imbedded in the environment of the equity practice which existed
before the statutes came into existence. The statutes themselves
clearly show that they apply to law and equity cases, and no distinc-
tion is made in them as to the treatment of both types of action.
The creators of the statutes said that they intended to apply the
principles of equity to them. The result is that we should look to
the old rule in equity practice as to the meaning of the term. We
find it stated by a great master of that subject, Story, that the
thing involved was treated as the subject of the action.' M He refers
to others who had reached the same conclusion. He specifically
treats only of cases involving tangible things. Can the same rule
be applied to instances where no tangible things are dealt with in
the cases joined or counterclaimed? Suggestions are found in which
the negative answer js given because, presumably, there is nothing
of a type similar to the tangible thing which can be used as the sub-
ject of the action where no tangible thing is connected with the cases.
The result is that it has even been decided that, since there should
be as part of every subject of the action something that could always
be at least a portion of it and since, where tangible things are involved,
they must be a part of the subject of the action, whenever such
tangible things are dealt with in a lawsuit they, and the right of
the person suing, are to be considered the subject of the action.
This conclusion is not to be upheld. In every case there is some
thing, tangible or intangible, which can be the subject of the action.
Examples follow. Where tangible things, including human bodies,
are involved, they are the subject of action. In contract actions,
when tangible things not including a written contract, are not in-
volved, the contract, written or unwritten, is the subject of the action;
in libel and slander cases, the reputation of the one suing is the sub-
ject of the action; in actions brought to recover for injury to the
iSTORY, EQUITY PLEADING, § § 26o, 261, and 508.
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marital relationship, the relationship of parent and child, or that of
master and servant, the relationship is the subject of the action.
To conclude that the thing under consideration is the subject of
the action mentioned in the statutes which are the theme of this
paper is reasonable. To do so gives proper weight to the historical
background of these enactments; it takes into consideration their
terms by making a real difference between cause of action, transaction,
and subject of the action; it gives to the transaction subdivision of
the joinder of actions statute a broader scope than is provided for
by its other subdivisions, for, under such an interpretation of that
phrase, as far as it is concerned, all actions may be joined under
the transaction subdivision which deal with any thing, tangible or
intangible, whether they are legal or equitable, in contract or in tort.
Some question has arisen under the joinder of actions and counter-
claim statutes as to whether or not the actions to be joined or counter-
claimed must always have some connection with the subject of the
action through transactions or directly. The wording of the statute
tells us that this is unnecessary. The joinder of actions statutes
provide for a joinder of actions arising out of the same transaction or
transactions connected with the subject of the actions. This means
that the actions may be joined if they arise out of the same transac-
tion or if they arise out of transactions connected with the same
subject of the action. Though some statutes have no commas, others
have one after transaction, others after transactions, and still others
after both of these words, the result should be the same. Actions
arising out of the same transaction need not, to be joined, be con-
nected with the subject of the action. This is correct because or is a
co6rdinating particle that marks an alternative. It often connects
a series of words or phrases presenting a choice of either.'95 There-
fore all that comes after or is an alternative to that which precedes
it. Connected with the subject of the action is a restrictive phrase which
is inseparably connected with the word transactions which it modifies;
to omit it would change the thought of the main phrase. They
should not be set off by commas. 9 ' Therefore, any comma after
transactions is improper and has no effect on the meaning of the
section. Also, causes of action need not, to be joined, arise out
of the same transaction if they arise out of different transactions
connected with the subject of the action. The counterclaim statute
permits the defendant to plead a counterclaim which arises out of
195WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY; MuRRAy's NEW OXFORD
DICTIONARY.
'"CENTURY HANBDOOK OF WRITING, GREEVER AND JONES, Article 91 (d).
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the transaction set forth in the plaintiff's original pleading or to
plead a counterclaim which is connected with the subject of the
plaintiff's action. The word or shows us that he may do either,
and if the action of the defendant arises out of the transaction origi-
nally pleaded by the plaintiff, it need not be connected with the
subject of plaintiff's action, and vice versa.
The term if they arise out of the same transaction or transactions
found in the joinder of actions statute and the phrase if they arise
out of the same transaction which is embodied in the counterclaim
statute mean that the facts essential to the creation of the actions
to be joined or counterclaimed must be found in the transaction or
transactions.
It is provided that actions may be joined if they arise out of
transactions connected with the subject of the action, and one may
counterclaim actions connected with the subject of the action. This
merely means that the transactions or causes of actions must have
something to do with the subject of the action. It must not be for-
gotten that the actual situation, not what may be pleaded, deter-
mines whether ornot this connection exists.
It will be noticed- that in the joinder of actions section the subject
of the action is to be connected with transactions, whereas, in that
dealing with counterclaims the connection is with the causes of
action. This, however, should make no difference in what the subject
of the action must be under the terms of these two statutes, for if
the transaction is connected with the subject of the action, the
latter will also be connected with the cause of action, because the
factual element of the cause of action is found in the transaction.
Therefore, for a subject of the action to be of a type which can be
connected with the transactions mentioned, it must be of such a
nature that it can be connected with the cause of action.
Under the transaction subdivision of the joinder of actions statute
one should be able to join causes of actions whether or not those
types of actions are mentioned in its other subdivisions, unless the
statute prohibits this procedure. Statutes like that of Nevada,
which says that there may be a joinder under the transaction sub-
division, if the causes are not included in one of the other sub-
divisions thereof, should not be said to deny this privilege, but should
be read to mean that the transaction subdivision is effective if the
causes are not included in only one of the other subdivisions. Natur-
ally, if they are all covered by another single subdivision the transac-
tion clause is unnecessary. This broad interpretation can be used
without violation to the language of the statute. The inclusion of
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the words one of clearly shows this. If these were omitted, and the
statute read, "if the causes are not included in the other subdivisions,"
the result might be different.
All that is meant by that part of the joinder of actions section
which provides that actions joined must all belong to one of these classes
is that all the actions joined must belong to the type of actions
mentioned in a single subdivision of the statute, one of which is the
transaction subdivision. Therefore, this clause in the law does not
prevent the joinder of causes of actions of kinds mentioned in several
subdivisions other than the transaction subdivision, if they arise
out of transactions connected with the same subject of the action.
The reciprocal test mentioned by some courts, which allows a
counterclaim if the plaintiff could have counterclaimed if the defend-
ant had sued, is of no value. It gives no idea as to the meaning of
the terms in the counterclaim statute and argues in a circle.
Turning now to the joinder of plaintiffs statute we find that it
states that those may join as plaintiffs who have an interest in the
subject of the action and in the relief requested. This means that
they must have an interest in the subject of the action and an interest
in the relief requested, for here and is the connective. According to
Webster this conjunction signifies addition, and is used to connect
phrases. As a result, an interest should modify the subject of the
action and the relief requested. Some courts have, incorrectly, held
that an interest did not modify the relief requested, and have con-
cluded that though a partial interest in the subject of the action
was all that was necessary, each plaintiff joining was obliged to be
interested in all of the relief requested. The result should be the
same in law and equity cases, or when both legal and equitable
relief is requested.
By. an interest in the subject of the action and in the relief requested
is meant any type or measure of interest therein.
In closing my interpretation of this statute, I should like to con-
sider a situation which has caused great differences in opinion.
Presume that A and B own different pieces of property along a
stream in which body of water they have riparian rights. C, who
runs a factory further up the stream, pollutes it with refuse from
his factory to such an extent that A and B can not get the use of
the stream to which they are entitled. They join in an action against
C, requesting an injunction against the pollution and a single sum
for past injuries. Some courts have held that there could be no
joinder because land was the subject of each plaintiff's action and
neither had any interest in that of the other. Others have passed
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over this point, but have refused to permit the joinder because each
plaintiff did not have an interest in all of the relief requested, since
neither had an interest in all of the damages demanded. Some
of the latter courts have allowed a joinder in such cases if the relief
requested was only an injunction, for then each plaintiff would
have an interest in all of the relief demanded, since each wanted an
entire injunction. Still others have permitted the joinder in the
case stated. This view is the proper one. The water is the subject
of the action, and each plaintiff had an interest in it and in the
relief requested. The court could provide for a division of the
damages recovered by leaving that to the parties or by the use of any
legal proceeding provided by statute, or otherwise, if such existed.
We have surveyed the statutes, investigated the authorities
interpreting them, and suggested our own idea of their meaning.
Though such adventures are of interest and of some value, if passably
well done, since these statutes exist today in many of the states of
the union and will continue to be on the statute books for many
years to come, we need something further. We need a change so
that the statutory laws relating to joinder and counterclaim will be
clearly and unmistakably understood by those who read them.
This can best be done by legislatures providing for the making of
rules of court by some body of lawyers. This is to be preferred to
changes by the legislatures, for, if it is found that any alterations do
not work, a further modification thereof could easily be made by a
rule-making body, but not by a legislature, since legislatures are
slow to move and are not always in session.
Finally, I presume that it is the duty of an advocate of changes to
state what they should be. This I do with less fear and trembling
than would otherwise exist, since I shall borrow from the verst few
pioneers who are leading the way to saner statutes. These, then, are
the suggestions offered. Plaintiffs should be allowed to join any
actions which they, or any of them, have against the defendants,
or any of them. Defendants should be permitted to counterclaim
any cause of action which they, or any of them, have against the
plaintiffs, or any of them. All persons should be allowed to join as
plaintiffs who claim any relief against the defendant for injuries
caused them by him where, if such persons brought separate actions,
the same question or questions of law and fact would arise. There
should be a further law applicable to each of these statutes permitting
the court on its own motion, or that of either or both of the parties,
to order separate trials, or to make such other order as might be
expedient, whenever, for any reason, the court believes that justice
to the parties, the court, or the public demands such action.
